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The Hidden Tool in a Foreign Investorʼs Toolbox: 
The Trade Preference Program as a “Carrot and 
Stick” to Secure Compliance with International 
Law Obligations 
 
By Peter D. Fox & Charles B. Rosenberg* 
 
Abstract: This Article considers the use of the trade preference program as a tool to 
pressure a State to comply with its international law obligations.  Recent 
international investment disputes involving Argentina, Ecuador, and the Russian 
Federation bring to light the increasing utility of U.S. and EU trade preference 
programs as retaliatory mechanisms for such noncompliance.  Particularly where a 
host State either has not consented to arbitration or has allegedly failed to comply 
with an adverse award, this Article affirms that the trade preference program can 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
International investment, while providing access to new markets, 
resources, and labor, entails unique considerations from investing locally.  
One such consideration might arise if a dispute occurs between a foreign 
investor and a host State.  Historically, a foreign investor was limited to 
seeking redress in the domestic courts of the host State.1  Of late, however, 
perceived biases of local courts,2 together with the proliferation of 
international investment treaties containing investor-State arbitration 
provisions,3 have led foreign investors to turn to international arbitration to 
 
1 See Christoph Schreuer, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Course on 
Dispute Settlement, Module 2.1, at 7, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232 (2003), http://unctad.org/ 
en/docs/edmmisc232overview_en.pdf (“In the absence of other arrangements, a dispute between a host 
State and a foreign investor will normally be settled by the domestic courts of the host State.”). 
2 See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 214 (2008) (“Rightly or wrongly, the investor will fear a lack of impartiality from the courts of the 
state against whom it wishes it pursue its claim.  In many countries an independent judiciary cannot be 
taken for granted and executive interventions in court proceedings or a sense of judicial loyalty to the 
forum state are likely to influence the outcome of proceedings.  This is particularly so where large 
amounts of money are involved.”). 
3 See MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE 
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resolve their investment disputes.4  As evidenced by a comprehensive and 
growing body of case law,5 international arbitration has become a 
conventional method of investor-State dispute resolution. 
International arbitration, however, is not always an adequate answer.  
In some cases, the host State has not consented to arbitrate the dispute with 
the foreign investor; there is no compromis, no compromissory clause in an 
investment agreement or investment law, and no investment treaty to 
consult.6  In other cases, the host State has consented to arbitrate but then 
allegedly fails to comply with an adverse award.7  In these situations, the 
foreign investor needs an additional enforcement tool. 
This article examines one such tool: the “stick” of the trade preference 
program, which has been characterized in the literature as a “carrot and 
stick.”8  Specifically, this Article discusses the suspension of international 
 
PRINCIPLES 26 (2010) (“The first BIT was signed in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan.  By 1970 
there were 72 BITs, by 1980 165, and by 1990 385.  The numbers have grown even faster since 1990 
and the global total at the end of 2005 was put at 2,495.”).  In addition, multilateral investment treaties, 
such as the Energy Charter Treaty, and free trade agreements that contain investment chapters, such as 
the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Central America-United States-Dominican Republic 
Free Trade Agreement, have entered into force in recent years.  See generally Energy Charter Treaty, 
Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 11, 
Dec. 17, 1992; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Cent. Am.-Dom. Rep., ch. 10, Aug. 5, 2004. 
4 See MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 3, at 26 (“The large number of treaty 
arbitrations in recent years has been a product of an exponential growth in the number of BITs.”); 
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 2, at 214–15 (noting that a fear of lack of impartiality of the courts of 
the host State is one of the reasons for granting the foreign investor direct access to arbitration with the 
host State).  
5 For example, as of June 30, 2013, nearly 270 investor-State arbitrations administered by the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) had been concluded.  See List of 
Concluded Cases, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES (Jun. 30, 2013), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConclud
ed.  Investment treaty arbitration awards, unlike international commercial arbitration awards, are 
routinely published in full or in redacted form.  See, e.g., ICSID Arbitration Rules, INT’L CTR. FOR 
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, art. 48(4) (2007), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/ 
basicdoc/partF-chap06.htm#r48; NAFTA, Annex 1137.4; Newly Posted Awards, Decisions and 
Materials, INV. TREATY ARBITRATION, http://italaw.com/about.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2013) 
(providing “access to all publicly available investment treaty awards”); INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
CASE LAW, http://www.internationalarbitrationcaselaw.com/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2013) (summarizing 
investment treaty arbitration decisions). 
6 A compromis is an agreement to submit existing disputes to arbitration, while a compromissory 
clause is an agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration.  See generally Christoph Schreuer, 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Course on Dispute Settlement, Module 2.3, at 
7–24, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.2 (2003), http://unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add2_en.pdf 
(describing the principal ways in which States consent to arbitrate investment disputes with foreign 
investors).  See also infra Section IV(A) (noting that the U.S. shareholders of Yukos have been unable 
to commence international arbitration against the Russian Federation because there is no investment 
treaty providing for investor-State arbitration between the United States and the Russian Federation). 
7 See infra Section III(A) (examining Argentina’s alleged failure to comply with the Azurix and 
CMS Gas ICSID awards). 
8 See, e.g., Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back—Or Vice Versa: Labor Rights 
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trade benefits to secure a State’s compliance with its international law 
obligations.  Some might question the utility of this “stick” approach since, 
as opposed to international arbitration, it depends, at least in part, on the 
political discretion of the investor’s home State.  However, investors and 
host States (particularly developing States that are the beneficiaries of trade 
preference programs) should be aware that this “stick” strategy is more 
than an untested theory.  In 2012, the United States suspended Argentina’s 
preferential trade status under its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
as a result of Argentina’s alleged failure to enforce arbitral awards in favor 
of U.S. investors.9 
This Article reviews recent investment disputes involving Argentina, 
Ecuador, and the Russian Federation, and explores rationales for the 
suspension of a State’s preferential trade status based on its failure to fulfill 
international law obligations.  Section II presents the underlying principles 
behind trade preference programs and introduces the U.S. GSP scheme.  
Section III examines grounds for suspension of international trade benefits 
due to a host State’s failure to comply with arbitral awards.  This section 
focuses on recent developments involving Argentina and Ecuador under 
U.S. law, including the recent suspension of Argentina’s preferential trade 
status under the U.S. GSP.  Section IV discusses a separate basis for the 
suspension of international trade benefits: a host State’s expropriation of a 
foreign investor’s investment without prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation.  This section focuses on recent developments involving the 
Russian Federation and Argentina under U.S. and EU law.  Section V 
concludes by noting the increasing frequency of international investment 
disputes between foreign investors and host States.  Where international 
arbitration or traditional litigation do not offer viable methods of dispute 
resolution, all parties should be mindful of the trade preference program as 




Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and Beyond, 
37 U.S.F. L. REV. 689, 694 (2003) (“Unilateral American measures offer the ‘carrot’ of trade benefits to 
induce countries to improve their labor policies as a condition of being designated a beneficiary 
country.  These laws then provide the ‘stick’ of the threat of withdrawal of trade preferences if the 
country’s labor rights and other conditions fail to maintain the statutorily set standards, or fail to 
improve any further.”); Kristi Schaeffer, Note, Mercosur and Labor Rights: The Comparative Strengths 
of Sub-Regional Trade Agreements in Developing and Enforcing Labor Standards in Latin American 
States, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 829, 853–54 (2007) (“United States is able to employ a ‘carrot and 
stick’ approach in influencing the outcome of negotiations, in which the carrot is trade benefits and the 
stick is the threat of denial or withdrawal of those benefits.”). 
9 See infra Section III(A). 
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II.  TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS 
 
For more than three decades, the United States, the European Union, 
and several other developed States have maintained trade programs to 
promote export-driven economic growth in developing States through 
preferential tariff rates.10  In theory, this strategy frees “beneficiary” 
developing States from overdependence on trade in cultivated raw 
materials, whose price unpredictability and sluggish growth contribute to 
trade deficits.11  A distinguishing characteristic of trade preference 
programs is their unilateral, non-reciprocal nature.  Beneficiary States must 
continue to meet certain statutory standards to maintain their eligibility, 
which demonstrates the potential for a trade preference program to be 
utilized both as an economic assistance tool (carrot) and as a foreign policy 
tool (stick). 
The GSP is a trade preference program that was established, in part, to 
reconcile two competing economic approaches to trade equity.  Article I of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 (GATT) requires GATT 
Contracting Parties to extend most-favored nation (MFN) treatment to 
imports from other Contracting Parties.12  This means that a State cannot 
tax imports of the same item from different States at different rates.  Yet 
developing States opposed this principle of categorical tax treatment 
equality among trading partners, arguing that the equal treatment of 
unequal partners was discriminatory.13  Developing States instead pushed 
for special treatment in their favor, and without reciprocity.  GSP schemes 
thus provided a vehicle for unilateral special treatment for developing 
States while assuaging fears in developed States of domestic market 
disruptions stemming from tariff disarmament.14 
In 1971, the GATT Contracting Parties temporarily waived the MFN 
 
10 See About GSP, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. (2012), http://www.unctad.org/ 
en/Pages/DITC/GSP/About-GSP.aspx. 
11 See VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33663, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF 
PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE 2 (2012) (citing REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL OF THE OECD, THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: REVIEW OF THE FIRST DECADE 
9 (1983)). 
12 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, ¶ 1, Jan. 1, 1948, 55 U.N.T.S. 196 (“With respect 
to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation 
or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports . . . any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any 
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or 
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”). 
13 See André Sapir & Lars Lundberg, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences and Its Impacts, 
in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 195 (Robert E. Baldwin & Anne 
O. Krueger eds., University of Chicago Press 1984). 
14 See JONES, supra note 11, at 2. 
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provisions for a period of ten years.15  In 1979, the Parties adopted the 
Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (referred to as the Enabling 
Clause), which enshrined a permanent waiver to the MFN clause and 
authorized States to grant preferential tariff treatment under their respective 
GSP schemes.16  The Enabling Clause thus forms the legal basis for 
preferential trade programs, including the GSP. 
In the United States, the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) administers the GSP, which was first authorized by 
Title V of the Trade Act of 1974.17  The U.S. GSP, according to the USTR, 
is “designed to promote economic growth in the developing world” by 
extending duty-free treatment to thousands of products imported from 
developing States.18 
The U.S. GSP statute provides that the U.S. President may assign 
beneficiary developing country (BDC) status to a State in accordance with 
specific discretionary criteria.  The President also must act with “due 
regard” for the effect of export expansion on the beneficiary’s economic 
development as well as the anticipated economic impact of the designation 
on U.S. producers of competing products.19  The President must consider 
such factors as the level of economic development of the State,20 the extent 
to which the State has assured the United States that it will provide access 
to its market,21 and the extent to which the State is protecting intellectual 
 
15 See Generalized System of Preferences Waiver art. (a), Jun. 25, 1971, GATT B.I.S.D. 18S/24 
(“[T]he provisions of Article I [of the GATT 1947] shall be waived for a period of ten years to the 
extent necessary to permit developed contracting parties . . . to accord preferential tariff treatment to 
products originating in developing countries and territories with a view to extending to such countries 
and territories generally the preferential tariff treatment referred to in the Preamble to this Decision, 
without according such treatment to like products of other contracting parties . . . .”). 
16 See Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, arts. 1, 2(a), L/4903, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. L/4903 (“1. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord 
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to 
other contracting parties.  2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following: a) Preferential tariff 
treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products originating in developing countries in 
accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences”). 
17 See 19 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. 
18 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 
(GSP) GUIDEBOOK 3 (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter GSP GUIDEBOOK], http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/GSP%20Guidebook.pdf. 
19 See Trade Act of 1974, P.L. 93-618, Title V, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 2461.  
20 See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(2) (2002) (“In determining whether to designate any country as a 
beneficiary developing country under this subchapter, the President shall take into account . . . the level 
of economic development of such country, including its per capita gross national product, the living 
standards of its inhabitants, and any other economic factors which the President deems appropriate.”). 
21 See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(4) (“In determining whether to designate any country as a beneficiary 
developing country under this subchapter, the President shall take into account . . . the extent to which 
such country has assured the United States that it will provide equitable and reasonable access to the 
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property rights.22  The statute also mandates bases of explicit ineligibility 
for BDC status, including, for example, if a State is Communist23 or if a 
State aids or abets any individual or group that has committed an act of 
international terrorism.24 
The list of GSP-eligible articles and States can be modified during an 
annual review by the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), a body chaired 
by the USTR and made up of representatives from the U.S. Departments of 
Treasury, Commerce, Labor, State, Agriculture, and the Interior.25  The 
annual review determines whether there is a positive or negative impact on 
the economies of the United States and recipient States.  The TPSC’s GSP 
Subcommittee considers comments from interested persons—including 
private corporations—when it makes recommendations to the President 
regarding the continuing eligibility of beneficiary States.26 
 
III.  FAILURE TO ENFORCE ARBITRAL AWARDS 
 
One mandatory factor affecting BDC eligibility under the U.S. GSP 
statute is a State’s failure to comply with international arbitral awards in 
favor of U.S. persons: 
 
The President shall not designate any country a beneficiary 
developing country . . . if . . . [s]uch country fails to act in good 
faith in recognizing as binding or in enforcing arbitral awards in 
favor of United States citizens or a corporation, partnership, or 
association which is 50 percent or more beneficially owned by 
United States citizens, which have been made by arbitrators 
appointed for each case or by permanent arbitral bodies to which 
the parties involved have submitted their dispute.27 
 
This factor stems from an amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 
offered by Senator Robert Taft, Jr.,28 who was “extremely concerned” 
about the government of India’s “apparent refusal” to honor arbitral awards 
in favor of U.S. persons.29  Senator Taft lamented that the government of 
India effectively refused to honor adverse arbitral awards by routinely 
 
markets and basic commodity resources of such country and the extent to which such country has 
assured the United States that it will refrain from engaging in unreasonable export practices.”).  
22 See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(5). 
23 See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(A). 
24 See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(F). 
25 See generally 15 C.F.R. § 2007 (implementing regulations for the U.S. GSP); see also GSP 
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 18, at 10. 
26 See GSP GUIDEBOOK, supra note 18, at 10–11. 
27 See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(E). 
28 See TRADE ACT OF 1974, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1644, at 52–53 (1974) (Conf. Rep.). 
29 See 120 CONG. REC. 39,831 (1974). 
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directing them to its national courts, which rebuffed their enforcement.30 
Two contemporary international investment disputes are instructive on 
this issue.  The first is a 2012 decision by the United States to suspend 
Argentina’s preferential trade status under its GSP due to Argentina’s 
alleged failure to comply with the Azurix and CMS Gas International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) awards.  The second 
is the recent petition by Chevron Corporation (Chevron) to suspend 
Ecuador’s trade benefits following Ecuador’s alleged failure to comply 
with international arbitral awards.  The controversy arises out of the Lago 
Agrio dispute under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication 
Act (ATPA/ATPDEA), a U.S. trade preference program that similarly 
conditions benefits on compliance with arbitral awards. 
 
A.  Azurix/CMS Gas and Argentina 
 
 In May 2012, the United States suspended Argentina’s preferential 
trade status under its GSP program, in response to Argentina’s alleged 
failure to comply with the ICSID awards in Azurix and CMS Gas.31  This 
marked the first suspension in the history of the U.S. GSP for failure to pay 
an arbitral award.32 
 
1.  The Azurix and CMS Gas Disputes 
 
Argentina suffered a spectacular economic crisis in late 2001 and 
early 2002 that led to a spate of international arbitration claims by foreign 
investors.33  During the late 1980s, facing crippling hyper-inflation and a 
serious currency exchange crisis, the fledgling democratic government of 
President Carlos Menem instituted an expansive State reform program that 
included two key measures: (1) a restructuring of the public sector that 
included the privatization of State-owned public utilities through long-term 
concessions and licenses; and (2) a law that pegged the Argentine peso to 
the U.S. dollar on a one-to-one basis.34  The ensuing flood of foreign 
 
30 See id. 
31 See Proclamation No. 8788, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,899, 18,899 (Mar. 29, 2012).  The suspension was 
made pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462(b)(2)(E) and (d)(2), and took effect 60 days after the presidential 
proclamation was published in the Federal Register on March 29, 2012, i.e., on May 28, 2012. 
32 See US Suspends Special Tariffs for Argentina, BBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/business-17517838.  
33 See Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent Wave of Arbitrations Against Argentina Under Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: Background and Principal Legal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 41, 41 
(2004); see also Harout Samra, Five Years Later: The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the 
Argentine Financial Crisis and the ICSID Arbitration Boom, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 667, 
667–68 (2007). 
34 See Di Rosa, supra note 33, at 44; see also infra note 50.  President Menem’s audacious reforms 
were initially credited with bringing about an economic renaissance in Argentina following years of 
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investors that entered Argentina’s public utilities sector were attracted by 
the newly secure and stable investment environment touted by Argentine 
officials and U.S. investment banks alike.35  But in the wake of economic 
collapse, the Argentine government abandoned these reform policies.  
Argentina’s retreat unilaterally altered existing contracts with foreign 
investors and led multinationals to seek out international arbitration 
mechanisms for relief, contained in the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
signed by Argentina. 
 
a.  Azurix 
 
In 1996, the province of Buenos Aires in Argentina (Province) began 
privatizing its potable water and sewage services, which at the time were 
controlled by the Administración General de Obras Sanitarias de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires (AGOSBA).36  The privatization process 
granted the future operator a concession under a newly legislated 
regulatory framework,37 and the concessionaire was required to be a 
company incorporated in Argentina.38 
Following a successful bid by the Azurix group of companies, Azurix 
Buenos Aires SA (ABA) was duly incorporated in Argentina to act as 
concessionaire.  ABA was a subsidiary of Azurix Corp. (Azurix), a U.S.-
based water services firm incorporated in Delaware.  In June 1999, ABA, 
AGOSBA, and the Province executed an agreement that granted a 30-year 
concession for “the distribution of potable water, and the treatment and 
disposal of sewerage in the Province.”39 
In late 2001, after Argentina passed emergency measures to address 
its developing economic crisis, Azurix gave notice of termination of the 
concession and filed for bankruptcy.  Azurix maintained that Argentina’s 
emergency measures amounted to expropriation because they resulted in 
the non-application of the tariff regime agreed upon in the concession 
contract, which prevented Azurix from securing adequate financing.40 
In September 2001, Azurix requested ICSID arbitration against 
Argentina pursuant to the United States-Argentina BIT, alleging that 
Argentina expropriated its investment through measures tantamount to 
 
economic mismanagement by an entrenched military junta, but irresponsible tax and spending 
initiatives created mounting pressure that rendered the new environment unsustainable.  See Samra, 
supra note 33, at 673–76. 
35 See Di Rosa, supra note 33, at 44–45.  
36 See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 38 (July 14, 
2006). 
37 See Law No. 11.820, Provincia de Buenos Aires, Aug. 28, 1996, B.O. (Arg.). 
38 See Azurix, supra note 36, ¶ 38. 
39 See id. ¶ 41. 
40 See id. ¶ 43. 
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cancelling the concession.41  Azurix further alleged that Argentina failed to 
provide fair and equitable treatment to Azurix’s investment, and that it had 
taken arbitrary measures that impaired Azurix’s use and enjoyment of its 
investment.42  Argentina defended on the basis that this was a contractual 
dispute, the problems encountered by Azurix as operator were of its own 
making, the price paid for the concession was excessive, and Azurix did 
not comply with the terms of the agreement—in particular, its investment 
obligations.43 
The ICSID tribunal rendered an award in 2006, which, inter alia, 
rejected Azurix’s claim of expropriation but held that Argentina had 
breached the fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, and 
arbitrary measures provisions of the BIT.44  The tribunal awarded Azurix 
$165 million in compensation, representing the “fair market value of the 
concession” plus compound interest.45  In 2009, an ICSID ad hoc 
committee dismissed in its entirety Argentina’s application for annulment 
of the award.46 
 
b.  CMS Gas 
 
Argentina’s economic reform efforts also included the de-
nationalization of its gas sector.  Law No. 24.076 of 1992 (Gas Law) 
established a legal framework for the privatization of the gas industry and 
the regulation of natural gas transportation and distribution.47  The Gas Law 
divided Gas del Estado, the State-owned monopoly, into several business 
entities including Transportadora de Gas Norte (TGN), which was granted 
a license to transport gas in Argentina.48  Investors accessed TGN through a 
public tender offer,49 and by 1999, TGN was thirty percent owned by CMS 
Gas Argentina, a subsidiary of the U.S.-corporation CMS Gas 
Transmission Company (CMS Gas).  Under the new licensure and legal 
framework, tariffs were calculated in dollars, converted to pesos at the time 
of billing, and “adjusted every six months in accordance with the United 
 
41 See id.  The United States-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) provides that investor-
State disputes under the BIT may be submitted to, inter alia, ICSID arbitration.  United States-
Argentina BIT, art. VII(3)(a)(i). 
42 See Azurix, supra note 36, ¶ 43. 
43 See id. ¶ 44. 
44 See id. ¶ 442. 
45 See id. 
46 See Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Annulment Proceeding, 
¶ 179 (Sept. 1, 2009). 
47 See NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & LISE JOHNSON, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: KEY CASES FROM 2000–
2010 43 (2011), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/int_investment_law_and_sd_key_cases_2010.pdf.   
48 See id.  
49 See Samra, supra note 33, at 681.   
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States Producer Price Index [U.S. PPI].”50 
In July 2000, CMS Gas agreed to a temporary suspension of the U.S. 
PPI adjustment arrangement due to the severity of the Argentine economic 
crisis.51  The industry’s public regulatory authority subsequently announced 
that it would extend the duration of the adjustments freeze, and by August 
2000, an Argentine court issued an injunction formally suspending the July 
2000 agreement.52  As the economic crisis deepened in early 2002, the right 
of public utility licensees to adjust tariffs according to the U.S. PPI, as well 
as the calculation of tariffs in dollars, was terminated through a public 
emergency law.53 
In July 2001, CMS Gas requested ICSID arbitration against 
Argentina, alleging that Argentina violated its obligations under the United 
States–Argentina BIT when it suspended the tariff adjustment formula for 
gas transportation applicable to its investment.54  In 2005, the tribunal 
rendered an award that held that Argentina breached its obligations under 
the BIT by failing to accord fair and equitable treatment and failing to 
uphold its investment obligation.55  The tribunal awarded $133.2 million in 
compensation, plus interest.56  An ad hoc committee in 2007 upheld 
Argentina’s application for annulment of the award in part,57 but 
nonetheless sustained the overall holding in favor of CMS Gas.58 
Notwithstanding their ICSID awards, Azurix and CMS Gas remain in 
dispute with Argentina.  To date, these awards have not been paid.  Both 
Azurix and CMS Gas argue that Argentina’s failure to “abide by and 
comply with the terms of the award” violates Article 53 of the ICSID 
Convention.59 
 
50 Law No. 23.928 of 1991 on Convertibility and Decree No. 2128/91 fixed the Argentine peso at 
par with the U.S. dollar.  See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 53 (May 12, 2005).   
51 See CMS Gas, supra note 50, ¶ 60; BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & JOHNSON, supra note 47, at 43. 
52 See CMS Gas, supra note 50, ¶¶ 62–65. 
53 See id. ¶¶ 64–65; see also BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & JOHNSON, supra note 47, at 43–44.  
The tariffs were re-denominated in pesos at a rate of one peso to the dollar.  See CMS Gas, supra note 
50, ¶ 65.   
54 See CMS Gas, supra note 50, ¶ 4. 
55 See id. at 139. 
56 See id. 
57 See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (Annulment), 
Sept. 25, 2007, ¶ 159 [hereinafter CMS Gas Annulment] (annulling the tribunal’s ruling on the umbrella 
clause for failure to state reasons); see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 52(1)(e), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
[hereinafter ICSID Convention] (“Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in 
writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds: (e) that the award 
has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.”). 
58 See CMS Gas Annulment, supra note 57, ¶ 159. 
59 See ICSID Convention, supra note 57, art. 53(1) (“The award shall be binding on the parties and 
shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.  
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Argentina disagrees with Azurix’s and CMS Gas’s interpretation of 
the ICSID Convention.  It maintains that Article 53 of the ICSID 
Convention cannot be read in isolation.60  Instead, Argentina argues that 
Article 53 must be read in context with Article 5461 because these 
provisions are both included in Section 6 of Chapter IV of the ICSID 
Convention and “complement each other.”62  According to Argentina, 
Article 54 does not require it to pay ICSID awards until the award holders 
bring formal proceedings in the Argentine courts to collect payment, which 
Azurix and CMS Gas have not pursued.63 
 
2.  Suspension of Argentina’s U.S. GSP Benefits 
 
In May 2009, the GSP Subcommittee initiated the 2009 GSP Annual 
Review to review the status of certain BDCs.64  Azurix and Blue Ridge 
Investments, L.L.C. submitted petitions requesting that the United States 
withdraw Argentina’s designation as a BDC due to its purported failure to 
enforce the Azurix and CMS Gas awards (Blue Ridge, a Bank of America 
subsidiary, previously had purchased the CMS Gas award).65  Both 
petitions requested suspension of Argentina’s BDC status on the basis that 
Argentina had failed to “act in good faith in recognizing as binding or in 
enforcing arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens or a corporation, 
partnership, or association.”66 
The GSP Subcommittee accepted the petitions for review in August 
2010,67 but continued them into the 2010 and 2011 GSP Reviews.68  In 
 
Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement 
shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention.”). 
60 See Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, Argentina’s Response to the United States Department 
of State’s Letter, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, June 2, 2008, at 2. 
61 See ICSID Convention, supra note 57, art. 54(1) (“Each Contracting State shall recognize an 
award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed 
by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.”). 
62 See Siemens AG, supra note 60, at 2. 
63 For a further discussion of Argentina’s interpretation of the obligation to “abide by and comply 
with” ICSID awards in Article 53 of the ICSID Convention, see generally Charles B. Rosenberg, The 
Intersection of International Trade and International Arbitration: The Use of Trade Benefits to Secure 
Compliance with Arbitral Awards, 44 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 503 (2013). 
64 See 2009 Annual GSP Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 25,605, 25,605 (May 28, 2009) (initiation).  
65 See Petition for Review of the Republic of Argentina’s Eligibility Under GSP by Azurix Corp., 
2009 GSP Annual Review, 4 Dec. 2009; Petition for the Withdrawal of the Application of Duty-Free 
Treatment to Articles of Argentina by Blue Ridge Investments, L.L.C., 2009 GSP Annual Review, June 
23, 2010. 
66 See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(E).  
67 See 2009 Annual GSP Review, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,737 (Aug. 11, 2010) (notice regarding the 
announcement of petitions accepted). 
68 See GSP 2011 Annual Review Country Practice Petitions under Review, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/GSP%202011%20Annual%20Review_0.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
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March 2012, however, U.S. President Barack Obama issued a proclamation 
declaring that “it is appropriate to suspend Argentina’s designation as a 
GSP beneficiary developing country because it has not acted in good faith 
in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of United States” persons.69  The 
suspension took effect in May 2012, sixty days after the presidential 
proclamation was published in the Federal Register.70  Notably, this is the 
first time in the history of the U.S. GSP that the United States has 
suspended a State’s preferential trade status for failing to pay an arbitral 
award.71 
Argentinean imports will now be subject to the higher U.S. MFN 
import tariff rate, making exporting Argentinean goods to the United States 
more expensive.72  This will make it more difficult for Argentinean goods 
to compete in the U.S. market and might lead U.S. suppliers and consumers 
to substitute comparable products for Argentinean goods (e.g., Chilean 
wine instead of Argentinean wine). 
 
B.  Chevron and Ecuador 
 
In the footsteps of Argentina’s suspension from the U.S. GSP, 
Chevron petitioned the USTR to suspend Ecuador’s trade benefits under 
the ATPA/ATPDEA, a U.S. preferential trade program that provides 
reduced-duty or duty-free treatment for goods imported from Ecuador, as a 
result of Ecuador’s alleged failure to comply with international arbitral 
awards arising out of the Lago Agrio dispute. 
 
1.  The Lago Agrio Dispute 
 
In 2003, in a “makeshift courtroom” in an “overgrown oil camp” in 
northeastern Ecuador called Lago Agrio, 30,000 Amazonian settlers and 
indigenous people brought Chevron to trial for the contamination of 1,700 
square miles of Ecuadorian rainforest with crude oil, associated wastes, and 
the toxic compounds used for drilling that leaked into the Amazonian 
watershed.73  The legal antecedents of the case now span decades.  Texaco, 
which was acquired by Chevron in 2001, signed a drilling contract with 
Ecuador in 1964, and began full-scale oil production in 1972 before 
 
69 See Press Release, The White House, Presidential Proclamation—To Modify Duty-free 
Treatment Under the Generalized System of Preferences and for Other Purposes (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/presidential-proclamation-modify-duty-free-
treatment-under-generalized-s.  
70 See id.  
71 See US Suspends Special Tariffs for Argentina, supra note 32. 
72 See GSP Fact Sheet, EMBASSY OF THE U.S. IN BUENOS AIRES, ARG., http://argentina.usembassy.gov 
/gsp2.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2014).   
73 William Langewiesche, Jungle Law, VANITY FAIR (May 2007), available at http://www.vanityfair. 
com/politics/features/2007/05/texaco200705. 
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withdrawing from the State in the early 1990s.74 
In September 2009, concurrent with the underlying litigation of the 
Lago Agrio case, Chevron commenced ad hoc international arbitration 
proceedings against Ecuador in The Hague pursuant to Article VI of the 
United States–Ecuador BIT.75  Chevron maintained that Texaco had settled 
the Lago Agrio dispute with Ecuador in 1998, and that any adverse ruling 
by the Lago Agrio court would violate the United States-Ecuador BIT.76  It 
sought to enforce prior settlement and release agreements signed between 
Texaco and the government of Ecuador in the 1990s that allegedly released 
Texaco from liability related to environmental damage.  In its request for 
relief, Chevron requested, inter alia, declarations releasing Chevron from 
all liability and proclaiming Ecuador in breach of its obligations under the 
BIT.77 
In February 2011, the Ecuadorian court in Lago Agrio ruled against 
Chevron and imposed damages of $18.2 billion, later increased to $19 
billion.78  One year later, however, the arbitral tribunal in The Hague issued 
interim awards restraining enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment,79 and 
ruled that the tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the claims advanced by 
Chevron.80  That arbitration has now proceeded to the merits phase.81 
Chevron’s claims are unique in investment treaty arbitration because 
the company is asking a tribunal to invalidate a judgment awarded to non-
parties to the BIT arbitration: the private Ecuadorian plaintiffs in the 
 
74 Id. 
75 Claimants’ Notice of Arbitration, Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. Republic of 
Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23, at 16 (Sept. 23, 2009). 
76 Id. at 2.  Chevron maintains that the Lago Agrio case was “fraught with gross improprieties and 
denials of basic fairness and due process from beginning to end.”  See Petition Requesting Withdrawal 
or Suspension of the Designation of Ecuador as an Andean Trade Preference Act Beneficiary Country, 
Sept. 17, 2012, at 4. 
77 Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No 2009-23, 
Second Interim Award on Interim Measures, at 4 (Feb. 16, 2012). 
78 Maria Aguinda et al. v. Chevron Texaco Corp., Proceeding No. 002-2003 (Feb. 14, 2011), 
(Provincial Ct. of Sucumbíos, Sole Div.) (at first instance); Maria Aguinda et al. v. Chevron Texaco 
Corp., Proceeding No. 2011-0106 (Feb 7. 2012) (Provincial Ct. of Sucumbíos, Sole Div.) (on appeal). 
79 Chevron, supra note 77, at 3 (ordering “the Respondent (whether by its judicial, legislative or 
executive branches) to take all measures necessary to suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement 
and recognition within and without Ecuador of the judgments rendered in favour of the Ecuadorian 
plaintiffs”).   
80 Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case 2009-23, Third 
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, at IV 28 (Feb. 27, 2012). 
81 In October 2012, the United States Supreme Court rejected an appeal by Chevron to block the 
Lago Agrio court judgment.  See Supreme Court Denies Chevron $19bn Ecuador Appeal, BBC NEWS 
(Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19892561.  The Ecuadorian plaintiffs seek 
recognition and enforcement of the judgment in courts outside Ecuador.  See, e.g., Petition to Brazilian 
Courts to Recognize Ecuadorean Judgment, Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of 
Ecuador (S.T.J. 2012).   
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underlying Lago Agrio lawsuit.82  The company, at the same time, has 
petitioned the USTR to suspend Ecuador’s preferential trade benefits under 
the ATPA/ATPDEA. 
 
2.  Ecuador and the U.S. ATPA/ATPDEA 
 
The United States’ Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), enacted in 
1991, provided extensive reduced-duty or duty-free treatment for goods 
imported from four Andean countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Peru.83  The program was designed to discourage illicit drug production and 
trafficking in the region by incentivizing economic alternatives.84  In 
August 2002, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act 
(ATPDEA) renewed and replaced the APTA, extending duty-free treatment 
to any product not specifically excluded.85 
Until July 31, 2013, Ecuador was the only eligible beneficiary country 
remaining under the ATPA/ATPDEA.86  At the time of writing, the United 
States has not renewed Ecuador’s status.  Colombia and Peru have 
negotiated free trade agreements with the United States,87 and Bolivia was 
suspended from the ATPA/ATPDEA in 2008 for its failure to cooperate in 
the U.S. war on drugs.88  Ecuador has not negotiated a free trade agreement 
 
82 United States-Ecuador BIT, U.S.-Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. 103-15, art. VI(6); 
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 32(2) (1976).  Under the United States-Ecuador BIT and 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the tribunal’s awards are only binding on the parties to the investor-
State dispute.  
83 See generally Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/andean-trade-preference-act-atpa 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
84 Id. 
85 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SIXTH REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE 
OPERATION OF THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE ACT AS AMENDED 1 (2012) [hereinafter ATPA 
REPORT], http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3488.   
86 Ecuador’s beneficiary status under the ATPA expired on July 31, 2013.  Id. at 3; Doug Palmer, 
Congress to Let U.S. Trade Benefits for Ecuador Expire, REUTERS (July 25, 2013, 4:10 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/25/us-usa-ecuador-trade-idUSBRE96O1BL20130725.  The 
expiration occurred in the context of an unfolding international political drama: Ecuador incensed 
Washington lawmakers when it offered to consider an asylum application from former National 
Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden and, after a senior U.S. lawmaker threatened to revoke 
Ecuador’s trade benefits, Ecuador unilaterally renounced Ecuador’s ATPA/ATPDEA trade benefits.  Id.  
To compensate exporters for the estimated $23–$26 million per year of economic losses that will result 
from the re-imposed tariffs, Ecuador’s National Assembly passed a law on July 30, 2013 compensating 
affected exporters.  Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador to Compensate Exporters Hurt by End of U.S. Trade 
Preferences, WALL ST. J. (July 31, 2013, 3:36 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130731-
715304.html. 
87 United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, H.R. 3078, 112th Cong. (2011); United 
States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, H.R. 3688, 110th Cong. (2007). 
88 Proclamation No. 8323, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,677 (Nov. 25, 2008) (determining, after reviewing 
statutorily required public comments and a public hearing, that Bolivia no longer satisfies the eligibility 
criteria related to counternarcotics, and suspending Bolivia’s status as a beneficiary country for 
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with the United States, and now must pay the full tariffs on formerly duty-
free products. 
According to the USTR’s report to Congress regarding the program, 
U.S. imports from the Andean region increased forty-three percent over the 
past five years, and all twenty leading imports from the region in 2011 
were eligible for duty-free treatment when the ATPA/ATPDEA was in 
effect.89  Ecuador supplied thirty-nine percent of these U.S. imports in 2011 
($1.7 billion), and of that amount, ninety-three percent were Ecuadorian 
petroleum products ($1.6 billion).90  Other significant imports from 
Ecuador included cut flowers ($60 million) and fruits ($20 million), which 
accounted for 3.5 percent and 1.2 percent of ATPA/ATPDEA entries from 
Ecuador, respectively.91 
In similar fashion to how GSP-eligible articles and States can be 
modified during an annual review, Section 3202(f) of the ATPA/ATPDEA 
requires the USTR to submit to Congress a report on the operation of the 
trade preference program every two years.92  Before submitting the report, 
USTR must solicit comments on whether States are meeting the criteria set 
forth to maintain their beneficiary status.93 
Also similar to the GSP program, the ATPA/ATPDEA conditions 
preferential trade benefits on compliance with international arbitral awards: 
 
The President shall not designate any country a beneficiary 
country . . . if such country fails to act in good faith in 
recognizing as binding or in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of 
United States citizens or a corporation . . . which is 50 percent or 
more beneficially owned by United States citizens . . . .94 
 
3.  Chevron’s Petition 
 
In June 2012, the USTR issued its report to the U.S. Congress on the 
 
purposes of the ATPA/ATPDEA). 
89 Letter from the Embassy of Ecuador in the United States to the Assistant U.S. Trade 
Representative for Trade Policy and Economics, Sept. 17, 2012, at 2 (citing ATPA REPORT, supra note 
85, at 6–7).  However, U.S. imports under ATPA/ATPDEA decreased from 2010 to 2011, due in part to 
a lapse in the ATPA/ATPDEA during 2011.  ATPA REPORT, supra note 85, at 7.  Imports from 
Ecuador decreased 59 percent to $1.7 billion in 2011, from $4.2 billion in 2010.  Id. at 9.  
90 ATPA REPORT, supra note 85, at 9.   
91 Id. 
92 19 U.S.C. § 3202(f)(1) (2006). 
93 19 U.S.C. § 3202(f)(2). 
94 19 U.S.C. § 3202(c)(3).  A similar provision is contained in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), 
which provides duty-free access to the U.S. market for most goods from seventeen States in the 
Caribbean and Central America.  19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2006) (“[T]he President shall not designate 
any country a beneficiary country . . . if such country fails to act in good faith in recognizing as binding 
or in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens or a corporation . . . which is 50 per 
centum or more beneficially owned by United States citizens . . . .”). 
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ATPA/ATPDEA, which noted that certain “developments in the past few 
years give rise to concerns about the [Ecuadorian] government’s long-term 
commitment to international arbitration for the settlement of investor 
disputes,” including Ecuador’s termination of BITs, denunciation of the 
ICSID Convention, and handling of Chevron v. Ecuador.95  As a result, the 
USTR warned that the “[Obama] Administration is monitoring 
developments in connection with these matters under the relevant ATPA 
eligibility criteria.”96 
In August 2012, a conservative public policy think tank, the Heritage 
Foundation, advocated for the USTR to strip Ecuador of its trade benefits 
under the ATPA/ATPDEA (and even the GSP).97  Citing Ecuadorian 
President Rafael Correa’s purported lack of cooperation with the United 
States on free trade negotiations and anti-narcotics law enforcement, 
Ecuador’s withdrawal from the ICSID Convention, and attempts by 
Ecuador to seek enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment in Brazil and 
Canada, the Heritage Foundation maintained that Ecuador has “acted with 
contempt for the arbitral process and for [an] award favoring a U.S. firm.”98  
If similar behavior by Argentina led the USTR to suspend its GSP benefits, 
the Heritage Foundation wrote, then “[s]imilarly strong action should now 
be taken against Ecuador.”99 
Against this backdrop, the USTR initiated its 2012 Annual Review of 
the ATPA/ATPDEA in August 2012.100  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Foreign Trade 
Council, the U.S. Council for International Business, and the Emergency 
Committee for American Trade each asked the USTR to suspend Ecuador’s 
preferential trade benefits.101 
 
95 ATPA REPORT, supra note 85, at 26.  See also Chevron Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA 
Case No. 2009-23, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 80, at IV 28 
(upholding jurisdiction); Chevron Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, Final Award, at 132 (Aug. 31, 
2011) (awarding claimant $77.7 million in damages for Ecuador’s breach of Article II(7) of the United 
States-Ecuador BIT, plus $18.6 million in pre-award compound interest).  Recently the government of 
Ecuador initiated State-to-State arbitration against the government of the United States to clarify the 
scope of Article II(7) of the United States-Ecuador BIT, but the tribunal ultimately dismissed the case 
for lack of jurisdiction.  Luke Eric Peterson, United States Defeats Ecuador’s State-to-State Arbitration; 
Will Outcome Dissuade Argentine Copycat Case, INV. ARB. REP. (Sept. 2, 2012); see also United 
States-Ecuador BIT, supra note 82, art. II, ¶ 7 (“Each Party shall provide effective means of asserting 
claims and enforcing rights with respect to investments, investment agreements, and investment 
authorizations.”). 
96 See ATPA REPORT, supra note 85, at 25.  
97 See James M. Roberts, Ecuador Should Forfeit U.S Trade Preferences, THE HERITAGE FOUND. 3 
(Aug. 7, 2012), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/ib3695.pdf.  
98 Id. at 2.  The Second Interim Award mandated that Ecuador suspend enforcement of the Lago 
Agrio judgment “within and without Ecuador.”  See Second Interim Award on Interim Measures, supra 
note 77, at 1–2. 
99 See Roberts, supra note 97, at 3. 
100 See Andean Trade Preference Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,910 (Aug. 10, 2012).  
101 See generally Notice of Opportunity to File Comments on the Beneficiary Countries Under 
FOX&ROSENBERG_FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/14 9:25 PM 
Northwestern Journal of 




In its comments to the USTR, Chevron maintained that “exceptional 
circumstances” warranted the withdrawal or suspension of Ecuador’s status 
as a beneficiary State.102  Chevron principally argued that  
 
Ecuador’s failure to take all measures necessary to suspend or 
cause to be suspended the Lago Agrio Judgment is a failure to act 
in good faith in recognizing as binding or in enforcing an arbitral 
award in favor of a U.S. company, which is one of the seven 
statutory reasons that the President “shall not designate” a 
country as a beneficiary country under ATPA.103   
 
Chevron concluded that “[t]he United States should not be giving unilateral 
trade preferences to countries that fail to abide by their obligations . . . 
under arbitration awards.”104 
Ecuador’s ambassador to the United States, Nathalie Cely, submitted a 
comment to the USTR requesting that the Obama Administration maintain 
Ecuador’s trade benefits until the expiration of the ATPA/ATPDEA in July 
2013, and then push Congress for renewal of the program thereafter.105  
Ambassador Cely maintained that Ecuador has acted in good faith in 
recognizing as binding or in enforcing arbitral awards in favor of U.S. 
citizens or corporations, stating that “Ecuador has satisfied every final 
adverse award against it.”106 
At the time of writing, Chevron’s petition remains under review by the 
USTR.  However, the petition would seem to be moot as Ecuador 
renounced its preferential trade benefits under the ATPA/ATPDEA in June 
2013, and the U.S. Congress allowed the program to expire at the end of 
July 2013.107 
 
ATPA, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=USTR-2013-0018 (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2013) (Docket No. USTR-2013-0018). 
102 See Petition Requesting Withdrawal or Suspension of the Designation of Ecuador as an Andean 
Trade Preference Act Beneficiary Country, Sept. 17, 2012, at 1 [hereinafter Chevron ATPA Petition].  
Chevron previously filed two petitions seeking Ecuador’s withdrawal or suspension from the 
ATPA/ATPDEA on September 15, 2004 and September 12, 2008.  Id. at 1, n.1. 
103 See id. at 3 & nn.7–8; 19 U.S.C. § 3202(c)(3).   
104 See Chevron ATPA Petition, supra note 102, at 12. 
105 See Letter from the Embassy of Ecuador in the United States to the Assistant U.S. Trade 
Representative for Trade Policy and Economics 1 (Sept. 17, 2012). 
106 Id. at 3.  Ambassador Cely noted that as of September 17, 2012, Ecuador has satisfied the only 
three adverse arbitral awards that had become final: Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. 
Republic of Ecuador, Case No. UN3467; Duke Energy Electroquil v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/04/19; and Varaderos y Talleres Duran, Vatadur v. Republic of Ecuador, Comision 
Interamericana de Arbitraje Comercial, No. 50181T00413 06.  Id. at 3, n.14. 
107 See supra note 86.  While Ecuador can still receive duty-free treatment for many of its goods 
under the U.S. GSP program, some goods previously eligible for duty-free treatment under the 
ATPA/ATPDEA are not covered.  See Palmer, supra note 86.  In anticipation that the ATPA/ATPDEA 
program might not be renewed, Ecuador earlier petitioned the U.S. to add important uncovered products 
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IV.  EXPROPRIATION 
 
Another ground that has been relied upon by investors for the 
suspension of international trade benefits is a State’s expropriation of a 
foreign investor’s investment without prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation.  This section first examines the repeated attempts by U.S. 
shareholders of Yukos Oil Company (Yukos) to suspend the Russian 
Federation’s trade benefits under the U.S. GSP.  It then discusses the recent 
suspension of Argentina’s trade benefits under the EU GSP following 
Argentina’s expropriation of Repsol, a Spanish company. 
 
A.  Yukos and Russia 
 
The U.S. GSP statute prohibits the President from designating a State 
as a BDC if the State: 
 
has nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise seized ownership or 
control of property, including patents, trademarks, or copyrights, 
owned by a United States citizen or by a corporation, partnership, 
or association which is 50 percent or more beneficially owned by 
United States citizens, . . . unless . . . the President determines 
that prompt, adequate, and effective compensation has been or is 
being made to the citizen, corporation, partnership, or 
association . . . .108 
 
In recent years, a group of U.S. shareholders of Yukos, a Russian oil 
and gas company, has repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of Russia’s 
BDC eligibility under the U.S. GSP.  These shareholders allege that 
“Russia has illegally expropriated Yukos and has refused to provide 
prompt, adequate, or effective compensation to the U.S. citizens harmed by 
this expropriation.”109 
 
1.  The Yukos Saga 
 
In 2003, Yukos was one of the largest and most successful companies 
 
such as preserved artichokes, cut roses, and frozen broccoli to the GSP program.  Id. 
108 See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(D)(i)(I), (ii)(I).  Two other exceptions to the expropriation 
“mandatory” factor include instances where the President determines that: (i) “good faith negotiations 
to provide prompt, adequate, and effective compensation under the applicable provisions of 
international law are in progress, or the country . . . is otherwise taking steps to discharge its obligations 
under international law;” or (ii) the dispute has been submitted to arbitration.  See 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2462(b)(2)(D)(ii)(II)–(III).   
109 See, e.g., Letter from Covington & Burling LLP to Chairman of GSP Subcommittee of the Trade 
Policy Staff Committee 2 (Sept. 5, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Yukos Petition]. 
FOX&ROSENBERG_FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/14 9:25 PM 
Northwestern Journal of 




in Russia, producing more natural gas and oil than ChevronTexaco.110  In 
October of that year, the Russian authorities arrested Yukos founder and 
CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky.111  Two months later, the Russian Tax 
Ministry initiated a series of tax re-audits for the tax years 2000–2004, 
which resulted in the imposition of nearly $25 billion in new taxes on 
Yukos.112  The Russian courts meanwhile froze Yukos’s primary assets, 
which allegedly hampered the company’s ability to pay the new taxes and 
eventually led Yukos to declare bankruptcy.113  Yukos’s assets were sold at 
auction, and Russian state-owned companies ultimately emerged as the 
new owners.114 
Yukos shareholders allege that the Russian Federation engaged in a 
politically motivated assault to unlawfully discharge Yukos of its assets.  
They have sought recourse against the Russian Federation in a variety of 
fora, including at least three international arbitrations. 
In RosInvestCo v. The Russian Federation, a British investor of Yukos 
brought an international arbitration pursuant to the United Kingdom–USSR 
BIT.115  In 2010, the tribunal rendered a $3.5 million award in favor of the 
British investor.  In finding a violation of Article 5 of the BIT, the Tribunal 
held that “the Respondent’s measures, seen in their cumulative effect 
towards Yukos, were an unlawful expropriation.”116 
Quasar de Valores v. The Russian Federation was an international 
arbitration brought by Spanish investors of Yukos pursuant to the Spain–
USSR BIT.117  The tribunal rendered a $2 million award in 2012 in favor of 
the Spanish investors finding, inter alia, that “Yukos’ tax delinquency was 
indeed a pretext for seizing Yukos’ assets and transferring them to [Russian 
state-owned] Rosneft . . . [which] supports the Claimants’ contention that 
the Russian Federation’s real goal was to expropriate Yukos, and not to 
legitimately collect taxes.”118 
Finally, the majority shareholders of Yukos brought arbitration 
proceedings against the Russian Federation pursuant to the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT),119 a multilateral treaty that provides for investor-State 
 
110 See generally RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, Final Award, SCC Case No. 
V079/2005, Sept. 12, 2010; Quasar de Valores SICAV S.A. v. The Russian Federation, Award, SCC 
Case No. 24/2007, July 20, 2012; Allen v. Russian Federation, 522 F. Supp.2d 167 (D.D.C. 2007). 
111 See Quasar de Valores, supra note 110, ¶ 47. 
112 See id.   
113 See id. ¶¶ 89–97. 
114 See id. ¶¶ 157, 169. 
115 See RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, Award on Jurisdiction, SCC Case No. 
V079/2005, Oct. 2007.   
116 See RosInvestCo, supra note 110, ¶¶ 633, 676. 
117 See Renta4 S.V.S.A. v. The Russian Federation, Award on Preliminary Objections, SCC Case 
No. V024/2007, Mar. 20, 2009. 
118 See Quasar de Valores, supra note 110, ¶¶ 177, 227. 
119 See generally Alison Ross, The Yukos Story—So Far, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Feb. 16, 2010, at 12, 
available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/journal/article/27647/the-yukos-story-so-far/.   
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arbitration of investment disputes in the energy field.120 
The investors—from Cyprus and the Isle of Man (a dependency of the 
United Kingdom)—are seeking $100 billion in compensation.121  The 
tribunal held in 2009 that it had jurisdiction over the dispute,122 and a five-
week merits hearing was held in the fall of 2012 in The Hague. 
The U.S. shareholders of Yukos, however, are in a different position. 
 
2.  U.S. Shareholders of Yukos 
 
There is no bilateral investment treaty or free trade agreement between 
the United States and the Russian Federation.  Nor is the United States a 
party to the ECT.123  Thus, unlike the British shareholder in RosInvestCo, 
the Spanish shareholders in Quasar, and the Cypriot and Manx 
shareholders in the ECT cases, the U.S. investors of Yukos have been 
unable to arbitrate their dispute against the Russian Federation.124 
As an additional hurdle, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 
shields the Russian Federation from the domestic courts of the United 
States.125  In 2007, for example, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia dismissed a lawsuit brought by U.S. shareholders of Yukos 
against the Russian Federation on the basis that neither the expropriation 
exception126 nor the commercial activities exception127 to the FSIA 
 
120 See generally, Matthew T. Parish & Charles B. Rosenberg, An Introduction to the Energy 
Charter Treaty, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 191 (2010). 
121 See Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases, THE ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.encharter.org/ 
index.php?id=213 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).  
122 See Hulley Enterprises Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 226 (Nov. 30, 2009); Yukos International Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. 
Russian Federation, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 227 (Nov. 30, 
2009); Veteran Petroleum Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 228 (Nov. 30, 2009).  The tribunal deferred to the merits phase of the 
arbitration its decision on the objections to jurisdiction and/or admissibility based on: (i) the “Taxation 
Measures” carve out in Article 21 of the ECT;(ii) “unclean hands;” and (iii) Russia’s contention that 
“Claimant’s personality must be disregarded because it is an instrumentality of a criminal enterprise.”  
See Hulley, supra at ¶ 600 (b), (c); Yukos International, supra at ¶ 601(b), (c); Veteran Petroleum, 
supra at ¶ 612(B), (c). 
123 See Members & Observers, THE ENERGY CHARTER, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=61.  
The United States merely is an observer to the Energy Charter Conference.  See id. 
124 See Letter from Covington & Burling LLP to Chairman of the GSP Subcommittee of the Trade 
Policy Staff Committee 5 (Dec. 5, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Yukos Petition] (“U.S. investors are unable 
to pursue arbitration directly against the Russian Federation. . . . American investors have a valid claim 
against Russia under international law, but they cannot bring a claim against Russia themselves because 
there is no bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in force between the United States and Russia.”); see also 
2006 Yukos Petition, supra note 109, at 1 (“To date, Russia has not agreed to let this case be heard on 
the merits in any forum.”).   
125 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1604 (1980). 
126 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(3) (1980) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction 
of courts of the United States . . . (3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law 
are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United 
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provided the U.S. court with jurisdiction over the Russian Federation.128 
For all of these reasons, the U.S. shareholders of Yukos have sought 
out alternative methods of redress.  One such avenue is the U.S. GSP, 
under which the Russian Federation receives substantial benefits.  In 2011, 
for example, the Russian Federation was the 8th largest U.S. GSP 
beneficiary, with $575 million in exports of duty-free products to the 
United States.129 
 
3.  Russia and the U.S. GSP 
 
Starting in 2006, in response to a request for comments on the 
continued eligibility of BDCs,130 a group of U.S. shareholders of Yukos 
submitted a petition requesting the suspension of Russia’s preferential trade 
status under the U.S. GSP.131  The shareholders claimed that the USTR 
should withdraw Russia’s GSP benefits because “Russia has illegally 
expropriated Yukos and has refused to provide prompt, adequate, or 
effective compensation to the U.S. citizens harmed by this 
expropriation.”132  The shareholders emphasized that “[t]o date, Russia has 
not agreed to let this case be heard on the merits in any forum.”133 
The U.S. shareholders were the only party to request the suspension of 
Russia’s GSP benefits on the basis of an expropriation without prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation.  Most comments advocated for 
maintaining Russia’s BDC status.134  Only one other comment opposed, 
 
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or 
that property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or 
instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial 
activity in the United States”). 
127 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2) (1980) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction 
of courts of the United States . . . (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on 
in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection 
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the 
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes 
a direct effect in the United States”). 
128 See Allen, supra note 110. 
129 See GSP by the Numbers, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/ 
sites/default/files/GSP%20by%20the%20numbers.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).  The seven larger 
GSP beneficiaries were India ($3.7 billion), Thailand ($3.7 billion), Brazil ($2.1 billion), Indonesia 
($2.0 billion), South Africa ($1.3 billion), the Philippines ($1.1 billion), and Turkey ($895 million).  See 
id.  
130 See 71 Fed. Reg. 45,079 (Aug. 8, 2006). 
131 See 2006 Yukos Petition, supra note 109.  
132 See id. at 2. 
133 See id. at 1.  
134 See, e.g., Letter from KC America to GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee 
(Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/gsp/asset_upload_file939_ 
9789.pdf (contending, inter alia, that “GSP treatment will help keep these Russian companies [in 
smaller manufacturing industries] competitive in the United States market.”); Comments of Alcoa, Inc. 
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and that was on the basis of Russia’s alleged failure to provide adequate 
and effective copyright protection to U.S. copyright owners.135  Despite the 
shareholders’ request, the USTR ultimately decided to maintain the 
Russian Federation’s preferential trade status, likely because of the 
overwhelming support from interested parties. 
In December 2011, the U.S. shareholders of Yukos again petitioned 
the USTR to review Russia’s GSP eligibility as part of the 2011 GSP 
Annual Review.136  This petition was made on two primary grounds.137  
First, the shareholders alleged a “direct” expropriation on the basis that 
“[t]he elimination of Yukos . . . resulted in the transfer of title to Yukos’s 
assets to new State owners.”138  Second, the shareholders claimed an 
“indirect” expropriation on the basis that the Russian taxes had the effect of 
destroying Yukos.139  In July 2012, the USTR deferred a decision on 
acceptance of the shareholders’ petition.140 
Most recently, in October 2012, the U.S. shareholders filed a renewed 
petition as part of the 2012 GSP Annual Review.141  The new effort argued 
 
on the 2006 GSP Eligibility and CNL Waiver Review Submitted to the GSP Subcommittee (Sept. 1, 
2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/gsp/asset_upload_file939_9789.pdf 
(“Alcoa urges that GSP eligibility be continued for Brazil, Russia and Venezuela. . . . Loss of GSP 
treatment for these products will cause significant disruption to our supply chain and harm our 
customers who rely on these products.”). 
135 See Letter from International Intellectual Property Alliance to GSP Subcommittee of the Trade 
Policy Staff Committee (Sept. 1, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/gsp/ 
asset_upload_file939_9789.pdf (“GSP duty-free benefits to Russia should be immediately withdrawn or 
suspended because of Russia’s failure to provide adequate and effective copyright protection to U.S. 
copyright owners, as required by the GSP program, specifically section 502(c)(5) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 
2462(c)(5)).”).  But see Letter from Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America to GSP 
Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
sites/default/files/uploads/gsp/asset_upload_file939_9789.pdf (“In sum, serious barriers exist to the 
adequate protection of U.S. pharmaceutical products in Russia.  Despite these difficulties, PhRMA 
members support the continuation of GSP benefits for Russia provided that these issues are resolved 
soon.”). 
136 See 2011 Yukos Petition, supra note 124.  The only other party that filed a petition regarding 
Russia in the 2011 GSP Annual Review was US Magnesium, who argued that imports of Russian pure 
magnesium should not be redesignated as eligible for GSP benefits.  See Letter from Economic 
Consulting Services, LLC to Chairman of the GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee 
(Apr. 5, 2012). 
137 See 2011 Yukos Petition, supra note 124, at 6–7.  The U.S. shareholders also contended that 
Russia’s economic development called its GSP status into question. 
138 See id. at 4–5; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(D)(i)(I) (1996). 
139 See 2011 Yukos Petition, supra note 124, at 5; see also 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(D)(i)(III) (1996).  
For a discussion on the distinction between a “direct” and “indirect” expropriation, see generally 
MCLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 3, at 290–97. 
140 See 77 Fed. Reg. 41,209, 41,210 (July 12, 2012).  The U.S. shareholders’ petition was in 
response to the USTR’s notice of initiation of the 2012 GSP Annual Review and request for petitions.  
See 77 Fed. Reg. 44,704 (July 30, 2012). 
141 See Letter from Covington & Burling LLP to Chairman of the GSP Subcommittee of the Trade 
Policy Staff Committee (Oct. 5, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Yukos Petition].  The petition was filed in 
response to the USTR’s Notice of Initiation of the 2012 GSP Annual Review.  See 77 Fed. Reg. 44,704.  
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that the 2012 decision in Quasar de Valores “made it abundantly clear that 
Russia has expropriated the assets of American citizens.”142  The 
shareholders’ appeal was the only petition filed in the 2012 GSP Annual 
Review regarding the Russian Federation’s preferential trade status.  Again 
the United States deferred a decision on acceptance.143 
 
B.  Repsol and Argentina 
 
Like the United States, the European Union also maintains a GSP 
scheme.  In 2012, the Spanish government and the European Parliament 
recommended that the European Union suspend Argentina’s GSP benefits 
as a result of Argentina’s expropriation of Repsol’s controlling stake in 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF). 
 
1.  The Repsol Dispute 
 
In 1999, the Spanish oil and gas company Repsol purchased YPF, an 
Argentinean company that, at the time, was the largest private oil and gas 
company in Latin America.144  YPF historically was a state-owned entity, 
only having been privatized in 1993.145 
Repsol owned a 57 percent controlling share of YPF by 2012.146  In 
April of that year, however, Argentine President Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner introduced a bill to the Argentine Congress to nationalize 51 
percent of the shares of YPF, worth an estimated $5 billion.147  The 
Argentine Congress approved the bill in May 2012 on the basis that Repsol 
did not sufficiently invest in Argentina to sustain oil and natural gas 
production, which forced the Argentine government to spend more on fuel 
imports.148 
Based on Argentina’s expropriation of YPF, Repsol commenced 
lawsuits against Argentina149 and Chevron150 in the United States District 
 
142 See 2012 Yukos Petition, supra note 141, at 1; see also id. at 2 (“It is now well settled that 
Russia expropriated the assets of American investors and compensation is due to them as a matter of 
international law.”). 
143 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, RESULTS OF THE 2012 GSP ANNUAL REVIEW 
16 (June 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012%20AR%20Results%20List_0.pdf.   
144 See Our History, REPSOL, http://www.repsol.com/es_en/corporacion/conocer-repsol/perspectiva 
_historica/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2014).   
145 See Argentina: Repsol Files YPF Nationalisation Complaint, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20588088.  
146 See id. 
147 See Jude Webber & Miles Johnson, Argentina to Renationalise Oil Group YPF, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 
17, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ae91248c-87e0-11e1-b1ea-00144feab49a.html#axzz2ExfUdLRr.  
148 See Alejandro Lifschitz & Karina Grazina, Repsol: Found Argentina Shale Oil Before YPF 
Takeover, REUTERS (July 26, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/26/us-argentina-ypf-idUS 
BRE86P1V920120726.   
149 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Repsol YPF, 
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Court for the Southern District of New York.  The latter suit is an attempt 
to prevent Chevron from partnering with YPF to develop oil and gas from 
shale formations in Argentina.  As reported, “Repsol is making good on a 
threat to launch legal action against any company that partners with YPF 
after Argentina seized control of Repsol’s majority stake in the energy 
company in April.”151  Repsol also commenced ICSID arbitration against 
Argentina in December 2012, pursuant to the Spain–Argentina BIT.152  
Repsol is seeking $10.5 billion in damages, making it one of the largest 
cases in ICSID’s history.153 
 
2.  The EU GSP and Suspension of Argentina’s Benefits 
 
On April 20, 2012, the European Parliament issued a resolution that 
“[d]eplore[d] the decision taken by the Argentine government, disregarding 
a negotiated solution, to proceed with the expropriation of the majority of 
shares of a European company” and thus “[u]rge[d] the European 
Commission and the Council to explore and adopt any measures required to 
safeguard European interests in order to avoid such situations arising again, 
including the possible partial suspension of the unilateral tariff preferences 
under the GSP scheme.”154  The government of Spain also reportedly 
pressured European Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht to suspend 
Argentina’s GSP benefits.155  These pleas were likely based on the provision 
 
SA et al. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-cv-3877 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012) (contending that Argentina 
has failed to follow the tender offer requirement in YPF’s by-laws); Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Repsol YPF, SA v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-cv-
4018 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2012) (seeking to compel Argentina to comply with the disclosure 
requirements of Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
150 Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Defendant Chevron Corporation’s Motion to 
Dismiss, Repsol, SA v. Chevron Corp., No. 12-cv-8799 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012). 
151 See UPDATE 1—Repsol Sues Chevron in U.S. Court Over YPF Deal, REUTERS (Dec. 4, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/04/repsol-chevron-ypf-uscourt-idUSL1E8N4CZ120121204.  
152 Repsol, S.A. and Repsol Butano, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/38.  
153 See Repsol Files YPF Nationalisation Claim at ICSID, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Dec. 4, 2012), 
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/31027/repsol-files-ypf-nationalisation-claim-icsid/.  
154 See European Parliament Resolution of 20 April 2012 on the Legal Security of European 
Investments Outside the European Union (2012/2619(RSP)) (emphasis added). 
155 See EU Ready to Cut Trade Benefits to Argentina Because of YPF; Warns the Region on 
Growing Protectionism, MERCOPRESS (May 7, 2012), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/05/07/eu-ready-
to-cut-trade-benefits-to-argentina-because-of-ypf-warns-the-region-on-growing-protectionism.  In April 
2012, the Spanish government announced that it would restrict imports of Argentinean biodiesels, 
which accounted for €750 million in exports to Spain in 2011.  However, after Argentina filed a 
complaint against the European Community at the World Trade Organization, the Spanish government 
announced in October 2012 that it would no longer implement the import restriction.  See generally 
Lucas Radicella, Spain Lifts Import Restrictions on Argentine Biofuels, ARG. INDEP. (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/newsfromargentina/spain-lifts-import-restrictions-
on-argentine-biofuels/; see also Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Argentina, European 
Union and a Member State—Certain Measures Concerning the Importation of Biodiesels, 
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in the EU GSP that allows for the temporary withdrawal of preferential trade 
status for a State’s “serious and systematic unfair trading practices which 
have an adverse effect on the Community industry and which have not 
been addressed by the beneficiary country.”156 
However, in light of the fact that the current EU GSP scheme is due to 
expire on December 31, 2013, the European Union adopted a new GSP 
scheme on October 31, 2012, with a “[b]etter focus on those countries most 
in need.”157  The new EU GSP scheme, which will apply as of January 1, 
2014,158 reduces the number of beneficiary States from 176 to 89.159  
Argentina is conspicuously absent from the list of beneficiaries. 
Argentina was removed as a GSP beneficiary not (at least expressly) 
because of its expropriation of Repsol’s investment in YPF; rather, the 
European Union terminated Argentina’s preferential status because 
Argentina had been classified by the World Bank as an “upper middle 
income economy”160 during the last three years.161  Argentina and the 
eleven other “upper-middle income countries” (as well as seven “high-
income countries”) lost their current beneficiary status but remain eligible 
to become beneficiaries again if their situations change (i.e., they no longer 
are classified as “high-income” or upper-middle income” countries).162  
 
WT/DS443/5, Dec. 7, 2012. 
156 See Regulation (EC) No. 732/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 211) 1, art. 15(1)(d); see also JC Lawrence, 
What Can the EU Do About Argentina’s Expropriation of Spanish Investments?, EUROPEAN LAW BLOG 
(Apr. 26, 2012), http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=431 (suggesting that the EU could suspend Argentina’s 
trade benefits under Article 15(1)(d) of the current GSP scheme).  The current EU GSP scheme, which 
was set to expire on December 31, 2011, was extended until December 31, 2013.  See Regulation (EU) 
No 512/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 145) 28, art. 1(5). 
157 See The EU’s New Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), EUROPEAN COMM’N 1, 3 (2012) 
[hereinafter EU GSP Factsheet], http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/october/tradoc_150028.pdf. 
158 See Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 303) 1, art. 43(2). 
159 See EU GSP Factsheet, supra note 157, at 4. 
160 In 2012, the World Bank defined “upper middle income economies” as those States having a 
gross national income (GNI) per capita between $4,086 and $12,615 in 2011.  “High income 
economies” were defined as those States having a GNI per capita in excess of $12,616.  See How We 
Classify Countries, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2013).  
161 See Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012, supra note 158, art. 4(1)(a) (“An eligible country shall 
benefit from the tariff preferences . . . unless: it has been classified by the World Bank as a high-income 
or an upper-middle income country during three consecutive years immediately preceding the update of 
the list of beneficiary countries . . . .”). 
162 See EU GSP Factsheet, supra note 157, at 5–6, 9, 18–19; see also Regulation (EU) No. 
978/2012, supra note 158, Annex I; Karel De Gucht, Remarks at the Press Conference on the Review of 
the Generalised System of Preferences, EUROPEAN COMM’R FOR TRADE 1, 2 (May 10, 2011), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147895.pdf (“All countries remain eligible to 
apply for the system should their economic situation change or should their special trade relationship 
with us lapse.”).  The other eleven “upper-middle income countries” are Belarus, Brazil, Cuba, Gabon, 
Kazakhstan, Libya, Malaysia, Palau, Russia, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  The new EU GSP also 
terminates benefits to seven States designated as “high-income countries,” including Bahrein, Brunei 
Darussalam, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.  See EU GSP Factsheet, 
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The European Commission explains: 
 
[T]hese more advanced developing countries no longer need 
preferences to export; in fact, continuing to provide preferences 
to them increases the competitive pressure on exports from LDCs 
[least developing countries] and other poor countries, which lag 
behind.  This is particularly damaging for these countries, in a 
context of increased competition due to the general drop in EU 
tariffs . . . . Even marginal drops in exports by the more 
advanced, bigger economies, can potentially provide significant 
opportunities for the poorest, whose exports are very small in 
comparison.  To give an idea of the order or magnitude, a drop of 
1% in, say, Brazilian exports, is equivalent to more than 16 times 
Burkina Faso’s total exports to the EU.163 
 
The removal of Argentina’s preferential trade status under the EU 
GSP will likely have significant adverse effects on Argentina, particularly 
when compounded with the concurrent suspension of trade benefits under 
the U.S. GSP.  The European Union is Argentina’s second largest export 
market after Brazil, with more than $10 billion in annual exports of goods, 
mainly agricultural products and raw materials.164 
It is significant that, like the current EU GSP scheme, the new EU 
GSP scheme again contains a provision for the temporary withdrawal of a 
State’s preferential trade status for “serious and systematic unfair trading 
practices including those affecting the supply of raw materials, which have 
an adverse effect on the Union industry and which have not been addressed 
by the beneficiary country.”165 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The United Nations reports that foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
ballooned worldwide over the last few decades.166  As disputes commonly 
arise out of business transactions, the proliferation of FDI inevitably will 
 
supra note 157, at 18–19. 
163 HIGHLIGHTS OF THE EU’S NEW GENERAL SCHEME OF PREFERENCES (GSP), EUROPEAN COMM’N 
5, 11 (Oct. 2012), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/october/tradoc_150027.pdf.  
164 See European Commission Directorate-General for Trade: Countries and Regions: Argentina, 
EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/argentina/ 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013).  Argentina’s third and fourth largest export markets are China and the 
United States, respectively.  See id.   
165 See Regulation (EU) No. 978/2012, supra note 158, art. 19(1)(d). 
166 Inward FDI grew exponentially worldwide from $13 billion in 1970 to $1.4 trillion in 2012, 
while during the same period, outward FDI increased worldwide from $14 billion to nearly $1.4 trillion.  
See Inward and Outward Foreign Direct Investment Flows, Annual, 1970–2012, UNCTADSTAT, 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).   
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result in an increase in international investment disputes between foreign 
investors and host States.  In some instances, like with the U.S. 
shareholders of Yukos, international arbitration will not be an available 
method of dispute resolution because no investment treaty providing for 
investor-State arbitration exists between the investor’s home State and the 
host State.  In other instances, the foreign investor may be reluctant to 
pursue domestic litigation in either the host State’s domestic courts as a 
result of perceived bias, or in the investor’s home courts due to sovereign 
immunity issues. 
Accordingly, investors and host States should be aware of the 
potential availability of a trade preference program as a “stick” to secure 
compliance with international law obligations.  For the investor, a 
preferential trade program may serve as an additional tool to induce a host 
State to cooperate.  From the host State’s perspective, the threat of 
suspension of preferential trade benefits will likely be taken into account 
when assessing the opportunity cost of pursuing certain actions that might 
affect a foreign investor or investment.  The need to be aware of these 
developments is further elucidated by the fact that in recent years 
commentators, private corporations, NGOs, individual investors, sovereign 
States, and even the European Parliament have advocated for the 
application of this “stick.”  Moreover, in light of the suspension of 
Argentina’s preferential trade status under the U.S. GSP in 2012, it is 
highly likely that foreign investors will increasingly seek the suspension of 
trade benefits as a tool to resolve their international investment disputes 
with host States. 
